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Abstract. Two types of tweakable blockciphers based on classical block-
ciphers have been presented over the last years: non-tweak-rekeyable and
tweak-rekeyable, depending on whether the tweak may influence the key
input to the underlying blockcipher. In the former direction, the best pos-
sible security is conjectured to be 2σn/(σ+1), where n is the size of the
blockcipher and σ is the number of blockcipher calls. In the latter direc-
tion, Mennink and Wang et al. presented optimally secure schemes, but
only in the ideal cipher model. We investigate the possibility to construct
a tweak-rekeyable cipher that achieves optimal security in the standard
cipher model. As a first step, we note that all standard-model security
results in literature implicitly rely on a generic standard-to-ideal trans-
formation, that replaces all keyed blockcipher calls by random secret
permutations, at the cost of the security of the blockcipher. Then, we
prove that if this proof technique is adopted, tweak-rekeying will not help
in achieving optimal security: if 2σn/(σ+1) is the best one can get with-
out tweak-rekeying, optimal 2n provable security with tweak-rekeying is
impossible.
Keywords: Optimal security · Standard model · Ideal model · Impos-
sibility · Tweakable blockciphers
1 Introduction
A blockcipher E : K × M → M is a family of permutations on M indexed
by a key k ∈ K. Tweakable blockciphers generalize over the classical ones by
the additional input of a tweak. More detailed, a tweakable blockcipher ˜E :
K × T × M → M satisfies the property that for every key k ∈ K and tweak
t ∈ T , ˜E(k, t, ·) is a permutation on M. The key is usually secret, but the tweak
is a parameter that is known or even chosen by the user. In 2002, Liskov, Rivest,
and Wagner [36] formalized the principle of tweakable blockciphers, and they
have gained broad attention since then.
A well-established way of designing a tweakable blockcipher is by building
it on top of a conventional blockcipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, such
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as AES (other approaches will be discussed in Sect. 1.3). In their seminal work,
Liskov et al. proposed two such constructions:
LRW1(k, t,m) = E(k,E(k,m) ⊕ t) , (1)
LRW2([k, h], t,m) = E(k,m ⊕ h(t)) ⊕ h(t) , (2)
where for the latter scheme, h is a universal hash function taken from a family
of hash functions H. Related to LRW2 is Rogaway’s XEX [50] and its generaliza-
tions by Chakraborty and Sarkar [15] and Minematsu [42]: these constructions
replace the masking h(t) by a tweaking function based on E(k, ·), and therewith
eliminate the use of h. All of these constructions, however, only achieve birthday
bound 2n/2 security.
1.1 Quest for Beyond Birthday Bound Security
Various attempts have been made to achieve security beyond the birthday bound,
and we identify two approaches: non-tweak-rekeyable schemes and tweak-rekeyable
schemes. In a non-tweak-rekeyable scheme, the key inputs to the underlying block-
ciphers are independent of the tweak, while in a tweak-rekeyable scheme, the tweak
value may have an influence on the key input to the underlying blockcipher.
In the direction of non-tweak-rekeyable schemes, the state of the art centers
around the security of σ ≥ 1 round LRW2:
LRW2[σ]([k, h], t,m) = LRW2([kσ, hσ], t, · · · LRW2([k1, h1], t,m) · · · ) ,
where k = (k1, . . . , kσ) are blockcipher keys and h = (h1, . . . , hσ) instantia-
tions of a universal hash function family H. Landecker et al. [35] and Proc-
ter [48] showed that this construction achieves approximately 22n/3 security for
two rounds, and Lampe and Seurin [34] proved security up to about 2σn/(σ+2) for
an arbitrary even number of rounds. It is conjectured that this scheme achieves
2σn/(σ+1) security for any σ ≥ 1 [34].
Tweak-rekeyable schemes on the other hand tend to achieve higher levels
of security easier, but require a different model. Minematsu [43] introduced the
following scheme:
Min(k, t,m) = E(E(k, t‖0n−t),m) , (3)
where t denotes the length of the tweak, and proved that it achieves security
up to max{2n/2, 2n−t}. It is straightforward to derive an attack on Min matching
this bound. Note that the scheme only achieves beyond birthday bound security if
t < n/2. The tweak size can be elegantly extended using the XTX construction
of Minematsu and Iwata [45] at the cost of an extra universal hash function
evaluation.
Mennink [38] introduced two constructions based on one, resp. two, blockci-
pher calls (for Men2 we use the adjusted function from the full version [39], see
also Sect. 5.2):
Men1(k, t,m) = E(k ⊕ t,m ⊕ z) ⊕ z, where z = k ⊗ t , (4)
Men2(k, t,m) = E(k ⊕ t,m ⊕ z) ⊕ z, where z = E(2k, t) . (5)
710 B. Mennink
The former is proven secure up to about 22n/3 queries, the latter approximately
optimally 2n secure. Wang et al. [56] generalized the approach of Mennink and
derived a wide class of optimally secure schemes. However, on the downside,
these constructions are all analyzed in the ideal cipher model, meaning that the
underlying blockcipher is assumed to be perfectly random.
1.2 Optimal Security in Standard Model?
The usage of the ideal cipher model for tweakable blockciphers (and for
symmetric-key schemes in general) can be considered controversial: the model
is significantly stronger and allows for better security bounds, as evidenced by
Mennink’s and Wang et al.’s constructions. In this work, we investigate the dis-
tinction between the standard and ideal model for the case of tweakable blockci-
phers, and show the existence of an insuperable gap: whereas in the ideal model
optimal security is possible fairly efficiently, we prove under reasonable assump-
tions that this cannot be achieved in the standard model.
Generic Standard-to-Ideal Reduction. All results on tweakable blockciphers
in the standard cipher model [15,34–36,42,43,48,50], implicitly rely on a generic
standard-to-ideal reduction, where the keyed blockcipher calls are replaced with
secret ideal permutations. This step usually costs AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D), where D is some
strong related-key PRP distinguisher with a certain amount of resources, usually
q queries to the keyed oracle Eφ(k) and τ time, and Φ is the set of related-key
deriving functions φ that D is allowed to choose. This reduction is in fact also
broadly used beyond the area of tweakable blockciphers, such as in authenti-
cated encryption schemes [1,3,11,21,28,33,37,44,50,51] and message authenti-
cation codes [4,13,16,24,29,30,41,47,57–59], and in fact, we are not aware of
any security result of a construction based on a standard-model blockcipher
that uses a structurally different approach. Inspired by this, we investigate what
level of tweakable blockcipher security can be achieved if this proof technique is
employed.
Lower bound on AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D). The generic reduction particularly means
that AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D) becomes a necessary term in the derivation, and we derive a
lower bound on this advantage, i.e. to see how much the loss is.
Pivotal to the analysis is the set of related-key deriving functions Φ, which
differs depending on the application. For instance, for LRW1 and LRW2 we would
have ΦLRW = {k → k} and the cost of the reduction is simply the strong PRP
security of E. For the cascade LRW2[σ], we would have
ΦLRW2[σ] = {k → ki | i ∈ {1, . . . , σ}} .
As the σ keys are independent this implies a reduction loss of σ times the strong
PRP security of E (see also [34,35]). In both cases, it is fair to assume that the
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strong PRP security of E is small. The situation gets more technical for tweak-
rekeyable schemes. For Min and Men2 we would have larger sets of key-deriving
functions:1
ΦMin = {k → E(k, t‖0n−t) | t ∈ {0, 1}t} ,
ΦMen2 = Φ⊕ ∪ {k → 2k} = {k → k ⊕ δ | δ ∈ K} ∪ {k → 2k} .
If the size of Φ increases, the related-key insecurity increases. In more detail,
we show that for any Φ and any E,
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D) ≥ Ω
(
min{q, |Φ|} · r
2n
)
,
where D can make q related-key queries to Eφ(k) for random key k and has time
to make r offline evaluations of E. (The bound is in fact a bit more fine-grained,
cf. Proposition 1, but above simplification is adequate for a proper understanding
of the result, and for Φ = ΦMin and Φ = ΦMen2 above bound matches the one of
Proposition 1.)
For Min, this bound entails a “minimal loss” of min{q, 2t} · r/2n, a term
which in hindsight perfectly explains the security level of Min. For Men2 the
loss is even worse: q · r/2n. (Also if the “subkey” 2k in Men2 is replaced by
an independent key k′, the same loss applies.) Concretely, this means that the
usage of the generic standard-to-ideal reduction entails impossibility of beyond
birthday bound security on Men2. Clearly, this does not invalidate the security of
Men2: this negative result is purely due to the lossiness of the generic reduction.
This issue is in fact not new: already in 1998, Bellare et al. encountered
it in their seminal paper on Luby-Rackoff backwards [8], and reverted to an
analysis in the ideal cipher model. A formal treatment of the situation, however,
has not been given. The issue also appeared for schemes based on primitives
other than blockciphers. Most prominently, the security of the HMAC message
authentication code is based on the PRF security of the underlying function [5,6].
As recently argued by Gazˇi et al. [23], this standard-model approach might be too
pessimistic, and [25] approached the security of HMAC in the ideal compression
function model.
Generalized Impossibility. We additionally demonstrate that the issue is not
specific to Men2, but applies to a broad spectrum of schemes. In more detail, we
consider a generalized construction of a tweakable blockcipher based on a block-
cipher, and show that, if the generic standard-to-ideal reduction is employed,
achieving optimal standard-model security with tweak-rekeying is at least as hard
as without tweak-rekeying. Given the state of the art on non-tweak-rekeyable
schemes, and particularly the conjecture on LRW2[σ], this shines a negative
1 The generic reduction does not directly apply to Men1 as the same key is used for
masking and encrypting, making the usage of the underlying cipher and the overlying
mode mutually dependent. This is usually resolved by using two independent keys,
such as in LRW2. In this case, ΦMen1 = Φ⊕.
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light on the possibility to find a tweakable blockcipher that is secure in the
standard cipher model. Note that the result does not imply that the generic
standard-to-ideal reduction is unavoidable, nor that optimal security cannot be
achieved, but if this reduction is employed and if the conjecture on LRW2[σ]
is true, optimality seems impossible for this generalized class of functions. The
approach followed for this impossibility result may be generalizable to different
types of primitives.
Discussion. It is reasonable to question the relevance of any result in any of
both models (other questions are discussed in detail in Sect. 8). It appears that,
while the ideal-model results may sometimes be a bit too promising, standard-
model results may be extremely loose. This is for instance the case for Men2,
where the ideal-model results seem more representative than the standard-model
ones. A similar observation was made by Shrimpton and Terashima [55], who
introduce the ideal model under key-oblivious access as a weakened version of
the ideal cipher model. As a general rule, it is always wise to interpret security
results in any of the models with care.
1.3 Other Ways of Tweakable Blockcipher Design
We briefly elaborate on approaches to tweakable blockcipher design, other than
constructing them from conventional blockciphers. One approach is to build
them “from scratch,” as is done for the Hasty Pudding Cipher [53], Mercy [20],
Threefish [22], and TWEAKEY [31]. This approach, however, does not allow
for any reductionist security argument. Goldenberg et al. [26] and Mitsuda and
Iwata [46] transformed generalized Feistel schemes into tweakable generalized
Feistel schemes. These constructions only achieve birthday bound security. A
novel approach is to build tweakable blockciphers from public permutations, as
is done by Sasaki et al. [52], Cogliati et al. [17,18], Granger et al. [27], and
Mennink [40]. This approach achieves comparable levels of security to the non-
tweak-rekeyable schemes of above, but the security analysis is inherently done
in the ideal permutation model.
1.4 Outline
Our model and the security of (tweakable) blockciphers are formalized in Sect. 2.
In Sect. 3 we define what we consider a reduction and what we mean with optimal
security. This section also includes a formalization of the generic standard-to-
ideal reduction. We derive a lower bound on the strong related-key PRP security
in Sect. 4. We revisit LRW2 and Men2 using these formalizations and results in
Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we present a generalized tweakable blockcipher design, and in
Sect. 7 we derive our impossibility result on the optimal security of a general-
ized tweakable blockcipher. We present an elaborate discussion of the results in
Sect. 8.
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2 Notation and Model
For a positive integer n, {0, 1}n denotes the set of bit strings of length n. If X is
some set, x $←− X denotes the uniformly random drawing of x from X . The size
of X is denoted by |X |.
2.1 Blockciphers
A blockcipher E : K × M → M is a mapping such that for every key k ∈ K,
Ek(·) = E(k, ·) is a permutation on M. For fixed k, its inverse is denoted by
E−1k (·). We denote by BC(K,M) the set of all such blockciphers. Letting P(M)
be the set of all permutations on M, the strong PRP security of E is defined as
AdvsprpE (D) =
∣
∣
∣Pr
(
DE±k = 1
)
−Pr
(
Dπ± = 1
)∣
∣
∣ ,
where the probabilities are over k $←− K and π $←− P(M), and the random coins
of D. Distinguisher D is typically bounded to have limited resources, such as τ
time and q queries to its oracle.
We will consider a generalized security notion that captures the case where a
distinguisher can perform related-key attacks. We follow the theoretical frame-
work of Bellare and Kohno [7] and its generalization to tweakable blockciphers
by Cogliati and Seurin [19]. Let Φ be a set of permitted related-key deriving
functions that map K′ → K. Define the function rk[E] : K′ × Φ × M → M as
rk[E](k, φ,m) = E(φ(k),m) .
Note that rk[E] is invertible for fixed (k, φ), and the inverse is defined the
straightforward way. The strong related-key PRP security of E is defined as
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D) =
∣
∣
∣Pr
(
Drk[E]±k = 1
)
−Pr
(
Drk[rE ]±k = 1
)∣
∣
∣ ,
where the probabilities are over k $←− K′ and rE $←− BC(K,M), and the random
coins of D. Distinguisher D is typically bounded to have limited resources, such
as τ time and q queries to its oracle.
Note that, for the sake of generality, the definition explicitly allows the
domain K′ and range K of the function φ to be distinct, although in many cases
one simply has K′ = K. If K′ = K and Φ = {k → k}, the definition of related-key
security boils down to the classical definition: Advsrkprp{k →k},E(D) = AdvsprpE (D).
Another famous set of related-key deriving functions is Φ⊕ = {k → k⊕δ | δ ∈ K}.
The set may also include more involved functions, e.g., ones that internally rely
on evaluations of E as well [2]. Throughout, for any set Φ, we assume that
it never contains two identical functions, and we denote by |Φ| the number of
functions in the set.
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2.2 Tweakable Blockciphers
A tweakable blockcipher ˜E : K ×T ×M → M is a mapping such that for every
k ∈ K and every tweak t ∈ T , the function ˜Ek(t, ·) = ˜E(k, t, ·) is a permutation
on M. Like before, its inverse is denoted as ˜E−1k (·, ·). Let ˜P(T ,M) consist of all
functions π˜ : T × M → M such that for all t ∈ T , π˜(t, ·) ∈ P(M). We define
the standard-model strong tweakable-PRP security of ˜E as
Advs-s˜prp
˜E
(D) =
∣
∣
∣Pr
(
D ˜E±k = 1
)
−Pr
(
Dπ˜± = 1
)∣
∣
∣ ,
where probabilities are over k $←− K and π˜ $←− ˜P(T ,M), and the random coins of
D. As before, D is typically bounded to operate in τ time and q queries to its
oracle.
This definition applies to an arbitrary tweakable cipher ˜E. The q queries are
solely made to ˜E±k or π˜
±, and the time τ can be spent at the distinguisher’s
discretion. Suppose ˜E uses a blockcipher E as underlying primitive. If we denote
by τE the uniform time needed for one evaluation of E, the distinguisher can
evaluate this underlying cipher at most r := τ/τE times. Assuming this block-
cipher E does not show underlying weaknesses, we can consider an abstraction
of the model and consider the distinguisher to be information-theoretic and
to have query access to E and ˜E±k . The approach is also known as the ideal
model [9,14,54]. More formally, we define the ideal-model strong tweakable-PRP
security of ˜E based on E as
Advi-s˜prp
˜E
(D) =
∣
∣
∣Pr
(
D ˜E±k ,E± = 1
)
−Pr
(
Dπ˜±,E± = 1
)∣
∣
∣ ,
where the probabilities are over k $←− K, E $←− BC(K,M), and π˜ $←− ˜P(T ,M), and
the random coins of D. Distinguisher D is typically bounded to make q queries
to its first (construction) oracle and r queries to its second (primitive) oracle.
3 Formalization of Reduction and Optimality
Formalization of Reduction. In order to formally argue about reductionist
security of tweakable blockciphers to classical blockciphers, we first settle our
definition of a reductionist proof.
Definition 1. Let ˜E be a tweakable blockcipher that internally uses a dedicated
blockcipher E. We say that the strong tweakable-PRP security of ˜E reduces to
the strong related-key PRP security of E if for any s-s˜prp distinguisher D there
exists an rk-sprp distinguisher D′ with comparable resources such that
Advs-s˜prp
˜E
(D) ≤ δ ·AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) + ε ,
where Φ is some set of related-key deriving functions depending on the design of
˜E, δ a small constant, and ε is a term negligible in the security parameter of ˜E.
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All existing standard-model security proofs on tweakable blockciphers from clas-
sical blockciphers [15,34–36,42,43,48,50] derive a reductionist bound of the form
of Definition 1. Even stronger, all of these results implicitly rely on a generic
standard-to-ideal reduction which we formalize in below lemma.
Lemma 1 (Generic Standard-to-Ideal Reduction). Let ˜E be a tweakable
blockcipher that internally uses a dedicated blockcipher E. Assume that ˜E makes
ρ calls to its underlying E and let Φ denote the set of all related-key deriving
functions under which E is evaluated. For any s-s˜prp distinguisher D,
Advs-s˜prp
˜E
(D) ≤ AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) +Advi-s˜prp˜E (D
′′) ,
where D′ is a distinguisher making at most ρ · q queries and running in time τ ,
and D′′ is an information-theoretic distinguisher making at most q queries to its
construction oracle and 0 queries to its primitive oracle.
Proof. The proof follows a simple hybrid argument: first replace the underly-
ing blockcipher evaluations by a random blockcipher rE $←− BC(K,M). This
step costs us AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′). For the remaining analysis of Advs-s˜prp˜E (D) with
E replaced with secret rE : the distinguisher has no access to rk[rE ]k as it does
not know k nor rE . Therefore, we can safely assume it has unbounded com-
putational power, and transform it to an information-theoretic adversary that
is not allowed to query the underlying primitive. Hence, we obtain the term
Advi-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′) where D′′ has resources (q, 0). unionsq
We remark that in Definition 1 and Lemma1, the set of related-key deriving
functions Φ depends on the tweakable blockcipher. In many cases, Φ just consists
of the identity function, Φ = {k → k}, in which case the related-key security
boils down to the classical strong PRP security. This is for example the case for
LRW1 and LRW2, cf. Theorem1 in Sect. 5. An example of a more elaborate set
of key-deriving functions is Φ⊕, cf. Theorem3 in Sect. 5.
We furthermore remark that Lemma 1 consists of a somewhat pessimistic
bounding: the distinguishers D′ and D′′ are in fact constructed from D, and a
more accurate bounding would be of the form
Advs-s˜prp
˜E
(D) ≤ AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′[D]) +Advi-s˜prp˜E (D
′′[D]) .
In the context of Lemma 1, one would usually maximize both sides of the inequal-
ity over all possible distinguishers D,D′,D′′, while in the more accurate bound-
ing one would simply maximize both sides over D. In other words, the bound of
Lemma 1 gives a slightly more pessimistic result, but nevertheless, it exactly cov-
ers the reduction that is implicitly used in the proofs of [15,34–36,42,43,48,50].
Beyond this list of tweakable blockcipher results, the reduction of Lemma 1 in
fact finds implicit use in myriad other blockcipher based cryptographic designs,
including various authenticated encryption schemes [1,3,11,21,28,33,37,44,50,
51] and message authentication codes [4,13,16,24,29,30,41,47,57–59]. We are
not aware of any security result of a construction based on a standard-model
blockcipher that does not follow this reduction but that uses a structurally dif-
ferent approach.
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Optimality. We additionally define what we mean with an optimally secure ˜E.
Definition 2. Let ˜E be a tweakable blockcipher that internally uses a dedicated
blockcipher E. We say that it is optimally standard/ideal-model secure if for any
distinguisher D making q queries to its construction oracle and r evaluations of
the primitive (where in the standard model, r = τ/τE):
Advs/i-s˜prp
˜E
(D) ≤ const · max{q, r}
min{|K|, |M|} ,
for some small constant const.
The term r/|K| corresponds to recovering the key for ˜E; apart from that, the
bound is rather arbitrary and conservative to maintain generality. We refer to
Bellare and Rogaway [10, Sect. 3.6] for an informal justification of the bound. We
refer to Bernstein and Lange [12] for an interesting discussion on the heuristic
existence of hard-to-find attackers.
4 Lower Bound on the Strong Related-Key PRP Security
We will derive a lower bound on the strong related-key PRP security of an arbi-
trary blockcipher E for any set of key-deriving functions Φ, demonstrating that
it can always be distinguished from a random blockcipher up to approximately
the birthday bound (apart from various technicalities). Earlier lower bounds, for
instance by Bellare and Kohno [7], targeted specific sets Φ, but it turns out that
the problem gets significantly harder if an arbitrary set of key-deriving functions
is considered. This is in part attributed to the fact that the lower bound would
depend on certain structural properties of Φ.
For a set of key-deriving functions Φ and a key k ∈ K, we write Φ(k) =
{φ(k) | φ ∈ Φ}. We denote by Ex (|Φ(k)|) the expected size of the set Φ(k),
where the randomness is taken over the choice of k $←− K.
Proposition 1. Consider a blockcipher E : K × M → M, and denote by τE
the uniform time needed for one evaluation of E. Let Φ be a set of related-key
deriving functions. There exists a distinguisher D making q queries and operating
in about τ time, such that
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D) ≥ max
Φ′⊆Φ,|Φ′|=q′
Ex (|Φ′(k)|) · r′
2|K| −
1
|M| − 1 ,
where q′ = min{q − 1, |Φ|} and r′ = τ/τE − 1, which are required to satisfy
q′ · r′ ≤ |K|.
Proof. Let k $←− K be the secret key used to instantiate the distinguisher’s oracle.
Let Φ′ = {φ1, . . . , φq′} ⊆ Φ be any subset of Φ of size q′. We construct
distinguisher DΦ′ as follows. Denote its oracle by Ok ∈ {rk[E]k, rk[rE ]k}.
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(i) Fix any m ∈ M;
(ii) Let K′ = {l1, . . . , lr′}
$⊆ K be a set of randomly drawn key values;
(iii) For i = 1, . . . , q′, query ci ← Ok(φi,m);
(iv) For j = 1, . . . , r′, evaluate yj ← E(lj ,m);
(v) If for some i, j we have ci = yj :
– Fix any m′ ∈ M\{m};
– Query c′i ← Ok(φi,m′) and evaluate y′j ← E(lj ,m′);
– If c′i = y
′
j , return 1;
(vi) Return 0.
Remains to bound the success probability of DΦ′ . Recall that
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (DΦ′) ≥ Pr
(
Drk[E]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
−Pr
(
Drk[rE ]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
, (6)
and we will analyze these probabilities separately.
Starting with first probability of (6), if φi(k) = lj for some (i, j), then we
necessarily have ci = yj and c′i = y
′
j . Therefore,
Pr
(
Drk[E]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
≥ Pr (∃l ∈ Φ′(k) : l ∈ K′)
=
∑
L⊆K
Pr (∃l ∈ L : l ∈ K′ | Φ′(k) = L)Pr (Φ′(k) = L) . (7)
Note that two independent sources of randomness are involved: the drawing of
the key k $←− K and the generation of random subset K′ $⊆ K. We proceed with
the first probability of (7) for any fixed L of size at most q′. Via the inclusion-
exclusion principle, Bonferroni’s inequality states
Pr (∃l ∈ L : l ∈ K′ | Φ′(k) = L)
=
q′
∑
β=1
(−1)β−1
∑
L′⊆L
|L′|=β
Pr (∀l ∈ L′ : l ∈ K′ | Φ′(k) = L)
≥
∑
l∈L
Pr (l ∈ K′ | Φ′(k) = L) −
∑
l,l′∈L
l 	=l′
Pr (l, l′ ∈ K′ | Φ′(k) = L) (8)
=
∑
l∈L
r
|K| −
∑
l,l′∈L
l 	=l′
(
r
2
)
(|K|
2
) =
|L| · r′
|K| −
(|L|
2
)(
r′
2
)
(|K|
2
) ≥ |L| · r
′
2|K| ,
as q′, r′ ≥ 1 and q′ · r′ ≤ |K|. This gives for (7):
Pr
(
Drk[E]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
≥
∑
L⊆K
|L| · r′
2|K| Pr (Φ
′(k) = L) = Ex (|Φ
′(k)|) · r′
2|K| .
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For the second probability of (6), focus on the indices (i, j) for which the if-clause
is evaluated. We have
Pr
(
Drk[rE ]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
≤ Pr (c′i = y′j | ci = yj
)
=
1
|M| − 1 ,
using that rE is a random permutation.
We thus obtain from (6):
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (DΦ′) ≥
Ex (|Φ′(k)|) · r′
2|K| −
1
|M| − 1 .
Note that this bound holds for every choice of Φ′. The claim of Proposition 1 is
satisfied for D = DΦ′′ , where
Φ′′ = argmax
Φ′⊆Φ,|Φ′|=q′
Ex (|Φ′(k)|) . unionsq
We remark that the bounding of Pr
(
Drk[E]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
could be improved (i) by
involving more terms of the inclusion-exclusion principle in (8), and (ii) for
specific sets of key-deriving functions Φ, by choosing Φ′ and K′ more smartly.
For instance, for Φ = Φ⊕, the bound reads
Pr
(
Drk[E]
±
k
Φ′ = 1
)
≥ q
′ · r′
2|K| ,
because Ex (|Φ′(k)|) = q′ for Φ′ ⊆ Φ⊕ of size q′. It is a straightforward exercise
to verify that, for a smart choice of Φ′ and K′, the probability can be pulled
up to q
′·r′
|K| . Nevertheless, the bound of Proposition 1 suffices for our purposes.
We furthermore remark that the attack of Bellare and Kohno [7] for Φ =
Φ⊕ ∪Φ+ is better than the one resulting from Proposition 1. In fact, their attack
exploits potential collisions in Φ, rather than preimages. A generalization of
Proposition 1 to cover attacks of this kind is beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, we think that it is an interesting problem to derive a generalized
tight attack on any E and for any Φ, or at least a generalized attack that covers
Proposition 1, the attack of Bellare and Kohno, and more.
5 Examples
We discuss two state-of-the-art examples: one from Liskov et al. [36], and one
from Mennink [38].
5.1 Liskov et al.’s Scheme
In their original work [36], Liskov et al. introduced two tweakable blockcipher
constructions, both achieving approximately 2n/2 security. We consider the con-
struction that is based on two keys: k ∈ {0, 1}n and h coming from a universal
hash function family H (see also Fig. 1):
LRW2([k, h], t,m) = E(k,m ⊕ z) ⊕ z, where z = h(t) .
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m cE
h(t) h(t)
k
Fig. 1. Tweakable blockcipher LRW2
m c
2k k ⊕ t
t
z
E E
Fig. 2. Tweakable blockcipher Men2
Follow-up results analyzed the security of a cascade of more than one indepen-
dent LRW2’s [34,35,48]; the currently outlined example directly generalizes to
these results.
Theorem 1 (Liskov et al. [36], Minematsu [42]). Let n ≥ 1, and let H be
an ε-almost 2-XOR-universal hash function family.2 Let D be a distinguisher
making at most q construction queries and running in time τ . Then,
Advs-s˜prpLRW2 (D) ≤ AdvsprpE (D′) + εq2 ,
where D′ is a distinguisher making at most q queries and running in time τ .
Note that the strong tweakable-PRP security of LRW2 reduces to the strong
PRP security of E in the terminology of Definition 1. The implicit presence of
the generic standard-to-ideal reduction of Lemma1 is obvious from the bound.
The term εq2 is the security bound for LRW2 if the underlying blockcipher is
replaced with an ideal secret permutation π.
5.2 Mennink’s Scheme
Mennink [38,39] recently introduced two tweak-rekeyable tweakable blockciphers
and analyzed them in the ideal cipher model. One of the constructions is the
following (see also Fig. 2):
Men2(k, t,m) = E(k ⊕ t,m ⊕ z) ⊕ z, where z = E(2k, t) .
Note that we have taken the adjusted scheme from the full version [39], where
the masking is done with key 2k instead of k. This adjustment was introduced in
order to resolve a simple oversight in the proof as pointed out by Wang et al. [56].
Mennink [39] showed that this (adjusted) scheme Men2 achieves approximately
2n security. We remark that Wang et al. generalized the approach to designing
optimally secure tweakable blockciphers. The currently outlined example directly
generalizes to the constructions of [56].
Theorem 2 (Mennink [38,39]). Let n ≥ 1. Let D be a distinguisher making
at most q construction queries and r primitive queries. Then,
Advi-s˜prpMen2 (D) ≤
q + r
2n
+
2qr
(2n − q)(2n − q − r) .
2 A hash function family H : K × X → Y is called ε-almost 2-XOR-universal if for all
distinct x, x′ ∈ X and y ∈ Y, Pr
(
h
$←− K : h(x) ⊕ h(x′) = y
)
≤ ε [32,49].
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It is easy to verify that for max{q, r} ≤ 2n/4, the advantage can be upper
bounded by 4max{q, r}/2n. Thus, Men2 is optimally ideal-model secure in terms
of Definition 2. In the standard model, using the generic transformation of
Lemma 1 and the definition of ΦMen2 from Sect. 1,
ΦMen2 = Φ⊕ ∪ {k → 2k} = {k → k ⊕ δ | δ ∈ K} ∪ {k → 2k} ,
one can obtain the following result on Men2:
Theorem 3. Let n ≥ 1. Let D be a distinguisher making at most q construction
queries and running in time τ . Then,
Advs-s˜prpMen2 (D) ≤ AdvsrkprpΦMen2,E(D′) +
q
2n
,
where D′ is a distinguisher making at most 2q queries and running in time τ .
Proof. By Lemma 1, we have
Advs-s˜prpMen2 (D) ≤ AdvsrkprpΦMen2,E(D′) +Adv
i-s˜prp
Men2 (D′′) ,
where D′ is a distinguisher making at most 2q queries and runs in time τ ,
and D′′ an information-theoretic distinguisher making at most q queries to its
construction oracle and r = 0 queries to its primitive oracle. By Theorem 2, we
have Advi-s˜prpMen2 (D′′) ≤ q2n . unionsq
While the bound of Theorem 3 seems to improve over the one of Theorem 2,
this is not the case. Indeed, by the remark after Proposition 1:
AdvsrkprpΦMen2,E(D′) ≥ Adv
srkprp
Φ⊕,E (D′) ≥
(2q − 1)(r − 1)
|K| −
1
2n − 1 = Ω
(
qr
|K|
)
,
contradictory implying that Men2 cannot be provably optimally standard-model
secure if the standard-to-ideal reduction is used. However, the attack of Propo-
sition 1 to break the strong RK-security of E for related-key deriving functions
Φ⊕ does not apply to Men2: its in- and output of E themselves are masked via a
key. A way to resolve this discrepancy would be to include the maskings within
the definition of related-key security, say the “strong masked related-key PRP”
but such a security notion would in fact be equivalent to the strong tweakable-
PRP security of Men2. It would be like reducing the security of E = AES to the
“AES-security” of E.
We note that in case one uses Men2 with two independent keys, i.e., replacing
2k with independent key k′, a comparable reasoning to that of Theorem3 gives
bound
Advs-s˜prpMen2 (D) ≤ AdvsrkprpΦ⊕,E (D′) +Adv
sprp
E (D′′) +
q
2n
,
where D′ and D′′ are distinguishers making at most q queries and running in
time τ . The same reasoning as before subsequently applies.
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6 Generalized Tweakable Blockcipher Design
We consider a generalized tweakable blockcipher ˜E based on a classical block-
cipher E. It follows the generic design of valid tweakable blockciphers by
Mennink [38], with two differences. First, for simplicity and sake of presenta-
tion, we separate the number of calls to E into ρ message-independent calls
and σ message-dependent calls, where ρ and σ are constants independent of the
security parameter n. This is without loss of generality, looking back at the for-
malization of [38] and the assumption that ˜E processes the data m “as a whole.”
Second, we will explicitly use two different keys ka and kb: kb is only used in
the key inputs to E and ka is only used in the masking (and indirectly in the
data inputs to E).3 We remark that our description is equivalent to the one of
[38] if we set ka = kb. In the generic design we consider tweaks of size n bits.
The generic construction easily generalizes to arbitrarily sized tweaks, but our
impossibility result of Sect. 7 assumes the tweak size to be close to n.
Formally, let n ≥ 1 and consider a blockcipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n. We consider a generic tweakable blockcipher ˜E[ρ, σ] : {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}n×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n based on ρ ≥ 0 message-independent precomputation calls to
E and σ ≥ 0 message-dependent calls to E as follows (see also Fig. 3):
procedure ˜E[ρ, σ](ka‖kb, t,m)
for i = 1, . . . , ρdo
xprei = A
pre
i (k
a, t, ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
i−1)
lprei = B
pre
i (k
b, t, ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
i−1)
yprei = E(l
pre
i , x
pre
i )
y0 = m
for i = 1, . . . , σ do
xi = Ai(ka, t, y
pre
1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ , yi−1)
li = Bi(kb, t, y
pre
1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ )
yi = E(li, xi)
return c = Aσ+1(ka, t, y
pre
1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ , yσ)
The functions Aprei : {0, 1}(i+1)n → {0, 1}n and Ai : {0, 1}(ρ+3)n → {0, 1}n
compute the data inputs to E (and are keyed via ka), while the functions Bprei :
{0, 1}(i+1)n → {0, 1}n and Bi : {0, 1}(ρ+2)n → {0, 1}n compute the key inputs
to E (and are keyed via kb). To guarantee invertibility of ˜E, we require that for
fixed ka, t, ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ the functions
Ai(ka, t, y
pre
1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ , ·)
are invertible for all i = 1, . . . , σ+1. (This is also the reason that Ai does not get
inputs y0, . . . , yi−2.) Apart from this condition, the functions A
pre
i , B
pre
i , Ai, Bi
3 Our generalized design, as well as all follow-up results, can be easily generalized to
the case of 2(ρ + σ) + 1 keys (one key for every processing function).
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E
Aprei
Bprei
ka
kb
t, ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
i−1
lprei
xprei y
pre
i m c
E E
A1 A2 Aσ+1
B1 Bσ
kakaka
kbkb
l1
x1 y1 x2
lσ
xσ yσ
inv. inv. inv.
t, ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ
· · ·
Fig. 3. Tweakable blockcipher E˜[ρ, σ]: precomputation of yprei (left) and processing of
m (right). “inv.” means that the function is invertible
can be any function, as long as they are sufficiently efficient. We put no limitation
on how these functions process t; it may be split apart and processed by multiple
functions separately.
Note that the message-independent precomputation calls can to a certain
extent be reordered. Without loss of generality, there exists a ρ′ ≤ ρ such that
ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
ρ′ are only used as inputs to A
pre
i , B
pre
i , Bi, and that y
pre
ρ′+1, . . . , y
pre
ρ are
also used as inputs to Ai. We define ρ′′ = ρ − ρ′.
6.1 Key-Uniformity
In the remainder of this work we will require a technical condition on ˜E, which
informally assures that ˜E does not behave structurally different for different
keys. For instance, it should not be the case that for some keys, l1 can take only
one value independent of the tweak, while for other keys, it can take 2n values
(one for every tweak). We will call this property “key-uniformity.” Note that the
condition slightly limits the generality of the scheme, but it is quite reasonable
that a scheme should behave comparably for all keys.
For brevity, view the functions Bprei for i = 1, . . . , ρ as mappings (k
a, kb, t) →
lprei , and the functions Bi for i = 1, . . . , σ as mappings (k
a, kb, t) → li. Note that,
indeed, (ypre1 , . . . , y
pre
i ), is a function of (k
a, kb, t) for any i.
Definition 3. We say that ˜E is c-key-uniform for some c ≥ 0, if there exist
λpre1 , . . . , λ
pre
ρ , λ1, . . . , λσ such that for any k
a‖kb ∈ {0, 1}2n:
for i = 1, . . . , ρ : 2λ
pre
i −c ≤ ∣∣rng(Bprei (ka, kb, ·))
∣
∣ ≤ 2λprei ,
for i = 1, . . . , σ : 2λi−c ≤ ∣∣rng(Bi(ka, kb, ·))
∣
∣ ≤ 2λi .
An observation we will use later on is that ˜E calls its underlying E with key-
deriving functions Φ = ΦpreB ∪ ΦB , where:
ΦpreB := {(ka, kb) → Bprei (ka, kb, t) | i ∈ {ρ′ + 1, . . . , ρ}, t ∈ {0, 1}n} ,
ΦB := {(ka, kb) → Bi(ka, kb, t) | i ∈ {1, . . . , σ}, t ∈ {0, 1}n} .
(9)
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6.2 Examples
The generalized design represents LRW2 of Fig. 1 for ρ = 0, σ = 1, ka = h
(abusing notation), kb = k, and the following processing functions:
A1(h, t,m) = h(t) ⊕ m,
B1(k, t) = k ,
A2(h, t, y1) = h(t) ⊕ y1 .
Note that LRW2 is 0-key-uniform (by putting λ1 = 0).
The generalized design represents Men2 of Fig. 2 for ρ = σ = 1, kb = k (ka
is not used), and the following processing functions:
Apre1 (t) = t , A1(t, y
pre
1 ,m) = y
pre
1 ⊕ m,
Bpre1 (k, t) = 2k , B1(k, t, y
pre
1 ) = k ⊕ t ,
A2(t, y
pre
1 , y1) = y
pre
1 ⊕ y1 .
Also Men2 is 0-key-uniform (by putting λpre1 = 0 and λ1 = n).
7 Impossibility
We will provide a heuristic argument that if the standard-to-ideal reduction of
Lemma 1 is used, optimal security in the standard model by a tweak-rekeyable
tweakable blockcipher as described in Sect. 6 is at least as hard as achieving it
by a non-tweak-rekeyable one. The analysis is based on below Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. For any scheme ˜E as described in Sect. 6 that is non-tweak-
rekeyable (hence, lprei and li are independent of t), and any T ⊆ {0, 1}n of size
|T | ≥ 2(ρ′′+σ)n/(ρ′′+σ+1), we have
Advi-s˜prp
˜E
(D) ≥ q
ρ′′+σ+1
2(ρ′′+σ)n
for some distinguisher D which only takes tweaks from T .
The lower bound on |T | in Assumption 1 is argued by the observation that
the bound on Advi-s˜prp
˜E
(D) is void for q ≥ 2(ρ′′+σ)n/(ρ′′+σ+1). In other words:
any attacker against ˜E will make at most approximately q ≤ 2(ρ′′+σ)n/(ρ′′+σ+1)
queries and thus require at most that many tweaks for its attack. The assumption
is discussed in further detail in Sect. 8.
Theorem 4. Let n ≥ 1 and let ρ, σ ≥ 0. Let ˜E be any tweakable blockcipher as in
Sect. 6 that is c-key-uniform for some small c. Let Φ be as in (9). If Assumption 1
holds, then
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) + maxD′′ Adv
i-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′)
= Ω
(
min
{
qr
2n
,
qρ
′′+σ+1
2(ρ′′+σ)n
,
r(ρ
′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)
2((ρ′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)−1)n
})
,
(10)
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where the first maximum is taken over all srkprp distinguishers D′ that make at
most (ρ′′ + σ) · q construction queries and at most r primitive evaluations, and
the second maximum is taken over all information-theoretic i-s˜prp distinguishers
D′′ that make q construction queries and 0 primitive queries.
We give an interpretation of Theorem4 in Sect. 7.1, and its proof in Sect. 7.2.
7.1 Interpretation of Theorem4
Suppose our goal is to prove security of ˜E against any s-s˜prp distinguisher D, that
can make q construction queries and r evaluations of the primitive. If we would
opt to follow the standard-to-ideal reduction of Lemma1, the first transition
would give us an unavoidable bound
Advs-s˜prp
˜E
(D) ≤ AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) +Advi-s˜prp˜E (D
′′) ,
where D′ is a distinguisher making at most (ρ′′ + σ)q queries4 and making r
primitive queries, and D′′ is an information-theoretic distinguisher making at
most q queries to its construction oracle and 0 queries to its primitive ora-
cle. Effectively, this step corresponds to replacing the ρ′′ message-independent
evaluations of E that are used by the masking functions A1, . . . , Aσ and the
σ message-dependent evaluations of E by a secret random related-key blockci-
pher rk[rE ]kb . The remaining ρ′ evaluations of E in the message-independent
precomputation occur indirectly via the related-key deriving functions.
A next step in the security analysis would be to bound both terms for the
strongest possible distinguishers D′ and D′′. However, Theorem4 shows that we
can impossibly prove optimal security of this bound in terms of Definition 2. The
theorem can henceforth be informally captured as follows.
Corollary 1. If 2σn/(σ+1) is the best one can get without tweak-rekeying, opti-
mal 2n provable security with tweak-rekeying via the generic standard-to-ideal
reduction is impossible.
The bound of Theorem4 is worse than the bound of Assumption 1, an unavoid-
able loss to cover worst-case scenarios. The loss shows that with tweak-rekeying
we can get closer to 2n than without tweak-rekeying, but we can never achieve
optimal security. That is, the bound of (10) cannot give 2n/const security pro-
vided that ρ and σ are constant.
The result leaves aside the question of whether the generic standard-to-ideal
reduction is strictly necessary. We will discuss this question in Sect. 8.
4 We remark that the complexity of D′ in Lemma 1 may be optimized depending on
the scheme: if ρ′ out of ρ calls to the underlying E are solely made for the purpose
of computing subkeys to later blockcipher calls, then these evaluations of E will be
absorbed by the set of related-key deriving functions. This is for instance the case
for Min of (3), where the set of key-deriving functions will be ΦMin of Sect. 1, and D′
can make at most q queries.
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7.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Before going to the proof of Theorem4, we will give a high-level intuition. The
core idea is to consider the two terms of (10), and to make a distinction depending
on how much freedom the distinguisher has in influencing the rekeying of the σ
message-dependent evaluations of E. We consider two cases:
(1) Tweaks have little to no influence on the rekeying of each of the blockciphers.
In this case, the lower bound on AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) (Proposition 1) will be small
and we cannot argue based on this part of the bound. On the other hand, the
distinguisher can select a large set of tweaks T for which the blockciphers
will never be rekeyed. This way, D would simply be considering a non-tweak-
rekeyable cipher, for which Assumption 1 applies;
(2) Tweaks have a significant influence on the rekeying of some of the blockci-
phers. In this case, the lower bound on AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) (Proposition 1) will
be significant, and imply the impossibility of an optimal security bound.
Combining the two cases will imply the lower bound of Theorem4. This high-
level overview omits a few technicalities. Most importantly, case (1) requires
an upper bound on the influence of the tweaks while case (2) requires a lower
bound. This is resolved using the c-key-uniformity of Definition 3.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). Let ka, kb be two fixed secret keys. Recall that ˜E
is c-key-uniform for some small c. Let
λ∗ = max{λpreρ′+1, . . . , λpreρ , λ1, . . . , λσ} .
We will derive a lower bound on
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) + maxD′′ Adv
i-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′) (11)
by making a case distinction depending on λ∗.
Case 2n−λ
∗(ρ′′+σ) ≥ 2(ρ′′+σ)n/(ρ′′+σ+1). For simplicity, we bound (11) as
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) + maxD′′ Adv
i-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′) ≥ max
D′′
Advi-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′) ,
and argue based on the i-s˜prp security, where the maximum is taken over any
information-theoretic D′′ that makes at most q construction queries and 0 prim-
itive evaluations.
By maximality of λ∗, there is a set T ′ ⊆ {0, 1}n of size
|T ′| ≥ 2
n
∏ρ
i=ρ′+1 |rng(Bprei (ka, kb, ·))| ·
∏σ
i=1 |rng(Bi(ka, kb, ·))|
≥ 2n−λ∗(ρ′′+σ)
such that Bprei (k
a, kb, t) = Bprei (k
a, kb, t′) and Bi(k
a, kb, t) = Bi(k
a, kb, t′) for all
t, t′ ∈ T ′. By Assumption 1, applied for this T ′, we obtain
max
D′′
Advi-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′) ≥ q
ρ′′+σ+1
2(ρ′′+σ)n
. (12)
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Note that T ′ is key-dependent and the distinguisher from Assumption 1 does not
know T ′. This is not a problem, though, as in (12) we are maximizing over all
distinguishers: the maximum over all distinguishers equals the maximum over
all distinguishers that only take tweaks from T ′, maximized over all possible
sets T ′.
Case 2n−λ
∗(ρ′′+σ) ≤ 2(ρ′′+σ)n/(ρ′′+σ+1). For simplicity, we bound (11) as
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) + maxD′′ Adv
i-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′) ≥ max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) ,
and argue based on the srkprp security, where the maximum is taken over any
distinguisher D′ that makes at most (ρ′′ +σ) ·q construction queries and at most
r primitive evaluations.
By Proposition 1,
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) ≥ max
Φ′⊆Φ,|Φ′|=q′
Ex (|Φ′(k)|) · r′
2n+1
− 1
2n − 1 ,
where q′ = min{(ρ′′ + σ)q − 1, |Φ|} and r′ = r − 1. Note that
max
Φ′⊆Φ,|Φ′|=q′
Ex (|Φ′(k)|) ≥ min{(ρ′′ + σ)q − 1, 2λ∗−c} .
This maximum is achieved for Φ′ being a subset of the set of key-deriving func-
tions for which the maximum λ∗ is achieved. As 2λ
∗ ≥ 2n/((ρ′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)), we
derive:
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) ≥
min{(ρ′′ + σ)q − 1, 2n/((ρ′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1))−c} · r′
2n+1
− 1
2n − 1 .
Assuming that 2
n/((ρ′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1))r′
2n+1+c ≤ 1 (otherwise the term will not influence
the bound), above term is lower bounded by
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) ≥ min
{
((ρ′′ + σ)q − 1)r′
2n+1
,
2nr′(ρ
′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)
2(n+1+c)(ρ′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)
}
− 1
2n − 1 .
Conclusion. We get for (11):
max
D′
AdvsrkprpΦ,E (D′) + maxD′′ Adv
i-s˜prp
˜E
(D′′)
= Ω
(
min
{
qr
2n
,
qρ
′′+σ+1
2(ρ′′+σ)n
,
r(ρ
′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)
2((ρ′′+σ)(ρ′′+σ+1)−1)n
})
,
assuming that c is a small constant. This completes the proof. unionsq
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8 Discussion
The results shine a negative light on optimal standard-model security of tweak-
able blockciphers and give rise to multiple questions.
What are the implications of the negative standard-model result on Men2 of
Theorem 3? Despite what the lower bound of Theorem3 suggests, the gap is
mainly caused by the estimation in the hybrid step. More detailed, the step
where E is replaced with AdvsrkprpΦMen2,E(D′) is extremely loose, and an attackerD′ that maximizes its success probability in breaking the related-key security
of E is not transformable to an attacker on Men2. Concretely, standard-model
security derivations simply cannot confirm this.
How do the standard and ideal model compare, and what are the implications
of results in both models? This question is not easy to answer. Results in the
ideal cipher model are likely to be over-optimistic, while the standard-model
results are too loose, mainly due to the seemingly necessary generic reduction of
Lemma 1. Intuitively, the “real” security of a scheme satisfies
ideal-model security ≤ “real” security ≤ standard-model security.
The question is, which of the estimates is tighter? In the ideal-model versus
standard-model results on Men2, Theorem2 versus Theorem 3, the standard-
model bound seems to be too loose. For different schemes, it may be the other
way around. A potential approach to go is to weaken the ideal-model, an app-
roach for instance followed by Shrimpton and Terashima [55], yet, this approach
is ultimately still an ideal-model approach.
In either situation, the findings of this work contribute to a better under-
standing of how both models compare, and demonstrate that results in the two
models should be interpreted with care. We believe that, taking these issues into
account, the ideal-cipher security model is still reasonable to consider.
Is Assumption 1 reasonable? Recall that Lampe and Seurin [34] conjectured that
the cascade of σ LRW2’s achieves 2σn/(σ+1) security (for the cascade of LRW2’s
we have ρ = ρ′ = ρ′′ = 0). Assumption 1 suggests that this is the best possible
for non-tweak-rekeyable tweakable blockciphers. Regardless of this, it is merely
used as starting point: if the assumption holds, then tweak-rekeying will not help
in achieving optimal security. Assumption 1 allows for some stretch: if it is not
true and a slightly more secure tweakable blockcipher can be constructed, the
results (and in particular Theorem4) generalize accordingly.
The heuristic bound in Theorem4 is better than the one of Assumption 1,
which indicates that tweak-rekeyability may result in a better bound than non-
tweak-rekeyability (but no optimal one). However, the derivation of the bound
of Theorem4 is very conservative. For instance, it relies on the superset bound
Φ ⊇ ΦB of (9) and on a lower bound on |ΦB |, both of which are loose. Tighter
bounds for Theorem4 may be achieved if more properties of ˜E are taken into
account.
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Can we Salvage the Generic Standard-to-Ideal Reduction? Theoretically,
Theorem4 gives a lower bound on an upper bound argued via the generic reduc-
tion of Lemma1. This is in itself little informative, yet it shows us that if this
classical first-step reduction is used, we cannot get optimal security. Note that
we do not claim that the standard-to-ideal reduction is unavoidable, but that if
this reduction is applied, the term of (10) is unavoidable. A way to circumvent
the usage of the reduction and the strong (related-key) PRP security defini-
tion as formalized in Sect. 2.1 may be by using a generalized security model for
blockciphers, such as the “strong masked related-key PRP security.” Such a gen-
eralized security model would, however, only absorb various design properties of
the tweakable blockcipher, and shift the problem instead of solving it.
Acknowledgments. Bart Mennink is supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under Veni grant
016.Veni.173.017. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of CRYPTO
2017 for their comments and suggestions.
References
1. Abed, F., Fluhrer, S., Forler, C., List, E., Lucks, S., McGrew, D., Wenzel,
J.: Pipelineable on-line encryption. In: Cid, C., Rechberger, C. (eds.) FSE
2014. LNCS, vol. 8540, pp. 205–223. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/
978-3-662-46706-0 11
2. Albrecht, M.R., Farshim, P., Paterson, K.G., Watson, G.J.: On cipher-dependent
related-key attacks in the ideal-cipher model. In: Joux, A. (ed.) FSE 2011.
LNCS, vol. 6733, pp. 128–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). doi:10.1007/
978-3-642-21702-9 8
3. Andreeva, E., Bogdanov, A., Luykx, A., Mennink, B., Tischhauser, E., Yasuda,
K.: Parallelizable and authenticated online ciphers. In: Sako, K., Sarkar, P. (eds.)
ASIACRYPT 2013. LNCS, vol. 8269, pp. 424–443. Springer, Heidelberg (2013).
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-42033-7 22
4. Andreeva, E., Daemen, J., Mennink, B., Van Assche, G.: Security of keyed
sponge constructions using a modular proof approach. In: Leander, G. (ed.) FSE
2015. LNCS, vol. 9054, pp. 364–384. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/
978-3-662-48116-5 18
5. Bellare, M.: New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without collision-
resistance. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 602–619.
Springer, Heidelberg (2006). doi:10.1007/11818175 36
6. Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Keying hash functions for message authen-
tication. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 1–15. Springer,
Heidelberg (1996). doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5 1
7. Bellare, M., Kohno, T.: A theoretical treatment of related-key attacks: RKA-PRPs,
RKA-PRFs, and applications. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol.
2656, pp. 491–506. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). doi:10.1007/3-540-39200-9 31
8. Bellare, M., Krovetz, T., Rogaway, P.: Luby-Rackoff backwards: Increasing secu-
rity by making block ciphers non-invertible. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) EUROCRYPT
1998. LNCS, vol. 1403, pp. 266–280. Springer, Heidelberg (1998). doi:10.1007/
BFb0054132
Insuperability of the Standard Versus Ideal Model Gap 729
9. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for design-
ing efficient protocols. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pp. 62–73. ACM, New York (1993)
10. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Pseudorandom
Functions (2005). http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/∼mihir/cse207/classnotes.html
11. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P., Wagner, D.: The EAX mode of operation. In: Roy, B.,
Meier, W. (eds.) FSE 2004. LNCS, vol. 3017, pp. 389–407. Springer, Heidelberg
(2004). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-25937-4 25
12. Bernstein, D.J., Lange, T.: Non-uniform cracks in the concrete: the power of free
precomputation. In: Sako, K., Sarkar, P. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2013. LNCS, vol.
8270, pp. 321–340. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-42045-0 17
13. Black, J., Rogaway, P.: CBC MACs for arbitrary-length messages: the three-key
constructions. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 197–215.
Springer, Heidelberg (2000). doi:10.1007/3-540-44598-6 12
14. Black, J., Rogaway, P., Shrimpton, T.: Black-box analysis of the block-cipher-based
hash-function constructions from PGV. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS,
vol. 2442, pp. 320–335. Springer, Heidelberg (2002). doi:10.1007/3-540-45708-9 21
15. Chakraborty, D., Sarkar, P.: A general construction of tweakable block ciphers and
different modes of operations. In: Lipmaa, H., Yung, M., Lin, D. (eds.) Inscrypt
2006. LNCS, vol. 4318, pp. 88–102. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). doi:10.1007/
11937807 8
16. Chang, D., Dworkin, M., Hong, S., Kelsey, J., Nandi, M.: A keyed sponge con-
struction with pseudorandomness in the standard model. In: NIST’s 3rd SHA-3
Candidate Conference 2012 (2012)
17. Cogliati, B., Lampe, R., Seurin, Y.: Tweaking even-mansour ciphers. In: Gennaro,
R., Robshaw, M. (eds.) CRYPTO 2015. LNCS, vol. 9215, pp. 189–208. Springer,
Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6 9
18. Cogliati, B., Seurin, Y.: Beyond-birthday-bound security for tweakable even-
mansour ciphers with linear tweak and key mixing. In: Iwata, T., Cheon, J.H. (eds.)
ASIACRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9453, pp. 134–158. Springer, Heidelberg (2015).
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3 6
19. Cogliati, B., Seurin, Y.: On the provable security of the iterated even-mansour
cipher against related-key and chosen-key attacks. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M.
(eds.) EUROCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9056, pp. 584–613. Springer, Heidelberg
(2015). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5 23
20. Crowley, P.: Mercy: A fast large block cipher for disk sector encryption. In: Goos,
G., Hartmanis, J., Leeuwen, J., Schneier, B. (eds.) FSE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1978, pp.
49–63. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). doi:10.1007/3-540-44706-7 4
21. Datta, N., Nandi, M.: ELmE: A misuse resistant parallel authenticated encryption.
In: Susilo, W., Mu, Y. (eds.) ACISP 2014. LNCS, vol. 8544, pp. 306–321. Springer,
Cham (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5 20
22. Ferguson, N., Lucks, S., Schneier, B., Whiting, D., Bellare, M., Kohno, T., Callas,
J., Walker, J.: The Skein Hash Function Family, submission to NIST’s SHA-3
competition (2010)
23. Gazˇi, P., Pietrzak, K., Ryba´r, M.: The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC.
In: Garay, J.A., Gennaro, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2014. LNCS, vol. 8616, pp. 113–130.
Springer, Heidelberg (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2 7
24. Gazˇi, P., Pietrzak, K., Tessaro, S.: The exact PRF security of truncation: Tight
bounds for keyed sponges and truncated CBC. In: Gennaro, R., Robshaw, M. (eds.)
CRYPTO 2015. LNCS, vol. 9215, pp. 368–387. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.
1007/978-3-662-47989-6 18
730 B. Mennink
25. Gazˇi, P., Pietrzak, K., Tessaro, S.: Generic security of NMAC and HMAC with
input whitening. In: Iwata, T., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol.
9453, pp. 85–109. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3 4
26. Goldenberg, D., Hohenberger, S., Liskov, M., Schwartz, E.C., Seyalioglu, H.:
On tweaking luby-rackoff blockciphers. In: Kurosawa, K. (ed.) ASIACRYPT
2007. LNCS, vol. 4833, pp. 342–356. Springer, Heidelberg (2007). doi:10.1007/
978-3-540-76900-2 21
27. Granger, R., Jovanovic, P., Mennink, B., Neves, S.: Improved masking for tweak-
able blockciphers with applications to authenticated encryption. In: Fischlin, M.,
Coron, J.-S. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2016. LNCS, vol. 9665, pp. 263–293. Springer,
Heidelberg (2016). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3 11
28. Hoang, V.T., Krovetz, T., Rogaway, P.: Robust authenticated-encryption AEZ
and the problem that it solves. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds.) EUROCRYPT
2015. LNCS, vol. 9056, pp. 15–44. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/
978-3-662-46800-5 2
29. Iwata, T., Kurosawa, K.: OMAC: One-key CBC MAC. In: Johansson, T. (ed.)
FSE 2003. LNCS, vol. 2887, pp. 129–153. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). doi:10.1007/
978-3-540-39887-5 11
30. Iwata, T., Kurosawa, K.: Stronger security bounds for OMAC, TMAC, and
XCBC. In: Johansson, T., Maitra, S. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2904,
pp. 402–415. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24582-7 30
31. Jean, J., Nikolic´, I., Peyrin, T.: Tweaks and keys for block ciphers: The TWEAKEY
framework. In: Sarkar, P., Iwata, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8874,
pp. 274–288. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8 15
32. Krawczyk, H.: LFSR-based hashing and authentication. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.)
CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 129–139. Springer, Heidelberg (1994). doi:10.
1007/3-540-48658-5 15
33. Krovetz, T., Rogaway, P.: The software performance of authenticated-encryption
modes. In: Joux, A. (ed.) FSE 2011. LNCS, vol. 6733, pp. 306–327. Springer,
Heidelberg (2011). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9 18
34. Lampe, R., Seurin, Y.: Tweakable blockciphers with asymptotically optimal secu-
rity. In: Moriai, S. (ed.) FSE 2013. LNCS, vol. 8424, pp. 133–151. Springer,
Heidelberg (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3 8
35. Landecker, W., Shrimpton, T., Terashima, R.S.: Tweakable blockciphers with
beyond birthday-bound security. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO
2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 14–30. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). doi:10.1007/
978-3-642-32009-5 2
36. Liskov, M., Rivest, R.L., Wagner, D.: Tweakable block ciphers. In: Yung, M. (ed.)
CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 31–46. Springer, Heidelberg (2002). doi:10.
1007/3-540-45708-9 3
37. McGrew, D.A., Viega, J.: The security and performance of the galois/counter
mode (GCM) of operation. In: Canteaut, A., Viswanathan, K. (eds.) INDOCRYPT
2004. LNCS, vol. 3348, pp. 343–355. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). doi:10.1007/
978-3-540-30556-9 27
38. Mennink, B.: Optimally secure tweakable blockciphers. In: Leander, G. (ed.) FSE
2015. LNCS, vol. 9054, pp. 428–448. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/
978-3-662-48116-5 21
39. Mennink, B.: Optimally secure tweakable blockciphers. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2015/363 (2015). Full version of [38]
Insuperability of the Standard Versus Ideal Model Gap 731
40. Mennink, B.: XPX: Generalized tweakable even-mansour with improved security
guarantees. In: Robshaw, M., Katz, J. (eds.) CRYPTO 2016. LNCS, vol. 9814,
pp. 64–94. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4 3
41. Mennink, B., Reyhanitabar, R., Viza´r, D.: Security of full-state keyed sponge and
duplex: applications to authenticated encryption. In: Iwata, T., Cheon, J.H. (eds.)
ASIACRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9453, pp. 465–489. Springer, Heidelberg (2015).
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3 19
42. Minematsu, K.: Improved security analysis of XEX and LRW modes. In: Biham, E.,
Youssef, A.M. (eds.) SAC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4356, pp. 96–113. Springer, Heidelberg
(2007). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74462-7 8
43. Minematsu, K.: Beyond-birthday-bound security based on tweakable block cipher.
In: Dunkelman, O. (ed.) FSE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5665, pp. 308–326. Springer,
Heidelberg (2009). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9 19
44. Minematsu, K.: Parallelizable Rate-1 authenticated encryption from pseudoran-
dom functions. In: Nguyen, P.Q., Oswald, E. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol.
8441, pp. 275–292. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5 16
45. Minematsu, K., Iwata, T.: Tweak-length extension for tweakable blockciphers. In:
Groth, J. (ed.) IMACC 2015. LNCS, vol. 9496, pp. 77–93. Springer, Cham (2015).
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9 5
46. Mitsuda, A., Iwata, T.: Tweakable pseudorandom permutation from generalized
feistel structure. In: Baek, J., Bao, F., Chen, K., Lai, X. (eds.) ProvSec 2008. LNCS,
vol. 5324, pp. 22–37. Springer, Heidelberg (2008). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88733-1 2
47. Mouha, N., Mennink, B., Herrewege, A., Watanabe, D., Preneel, B., Verbauwhede,
I.: Chaskey: An efficient MAC algorithm for 32-bit microcontrollers. In: Joux, A.,
Youssef, A. (eds.) SAC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8781, pp. 306–323. Springer, Cham (2014).
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13051-4 19
48. Procter, G.: A note on the CLRW2 tweakable block cipher construction. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2014/111 (2014)
49. Rogaway, P.: Bucket hashing and its application to fast message authentication.
In: Coppersmith, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 1995. LNCS, vol. 963, pp. 29–42. Springer,
Heidelberg (1995). doi:10.1007/3-540-44750-4 3
50. Rogaway, P.: Efficient instantiations of tweakable blockciphers and refinements to
modes OCB and PMAC. In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3329,
pp. 16–31. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30539-2 2
51. Rogaway, P., Bellare, M., Black, J., Krovetz, T.: OCB: a block-cipher mode of
operation for efficient authenticated encryption. In: ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pp. 196–205. ACM, New York (2001)
52. Sasaki, Y., Todo, Y., Aoki, K., Naito, Y., Sugawara, T., Murakami, Y., Matsui,
M., Hirose, S.: Minalpher v1, submission to CAESAR competition (2014)
53. Schroeppel, R.: The Hasty Pudding Cipher, submission to NIST’s AES competition
(1998)
54. Shannon, C.: Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28(4),
656–715 (1949)
55. Shrimpton, T., Terashima, R.S.: Salvaging weak security bounds for blockcipher-
based constructions. In: Cheon, J.H., Takagi, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2016.
LNCS, vol. 10031, pp. 429–454. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). doi:10.1007/
978-3-662-53887-6 16
56. Wang, L., Guo, J., Zhang, G., Zhao, J., Gu, D.: How to build fully secure tweak-
able blockciphers from classical blockciphers. In: Cheon, J.H., Takagi, T. (eds.)
ASIACRYPT 2016. LNCS, vol. 10031, pp. 455–483. Springer, Heidelberg (2016).
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53887-6 17
732 B. Mennink
57. Yasuda, K.: The sum of CBC MACs is a secure PRF. In: Pieprzyk, J. (ed.) CT-
RSA 2010. LNCS, vol. 5985, pp. 366–381. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). doi:10.1007/
978-3-642-11925-5 25
58. Yasuda, K.: A new variant of PMAC: Beyond the birthday bound. In: Rogaway, P.
(ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 596–609. Springer, Heidelberg (2011).
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9 34
59. Zhang, L., Wu, W., Sui, H., Wang, P.: 3kf9: Enhancing 3GPP-MAC beyond the
birthday bound. In: Wang, X., Sako, K. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol.
7658, pp. 296–312. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4 19
